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WHY EN BANC CONSIDERATION IS NECESSARY 
The panel decision conflicts with the express language of a federal 
rule of civil procedure and prior decisions of this Court regarding the preservation 
requirements for jury instruction errors.  The panel decision also conflicts with 
existing decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court regarding the kinds of 
statements that are actionable in defamation under the First Amendment.  
Consideration en banc is necessary to secure and maintain the uniformity of the 
Court's decisions on these questions of exceptional importance.   
In applying de novo review to an unpreserved instructional error, the 
panel decision eviscerates Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51and creates a new, 
sweepingly broad "awareness" exception that swallows the rule and renders it 
meaningless.  According to the panel, parties who do not comply with Rule 51 are 
not limited to "plain error" review—even though that is what Rule 51expressly 
provides since its 2003 amendment.  Nor are they required to satisfy the three 
criteria for what was historically this Circuit's "sole" common law exception to 
Rule 51.  Rather, the panel adopts an expansive new exception that is shockingly 
broad, unfair to trial judges and litigants, and opens the floodgates for unpreserved 
instructional errors.  It not only changes the outcome of this case, but substantially 
lowers the bar for preservation of instructional errors in this Circuit.   
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The panel decision also improperly extends First Amendment 
protection to a type of speech that is not constitutionally protected under the 
Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (1990).  
The panel decision, which holds public accusations of criminal conduct to be 
constitutionally protected "opinion," conflicts with Milkovich and this Court's own 
post-Milkovich decisions.   
FACTS 
This is a defamation action.  Defendant Crystal Cox made numerous 
false statements about Kevin Padrick and Obsidian ("Plaintiffs") in online blogs, 
accusing them of criminal conduct in their business, then offered to remove them 
for, in the district court's words, the "small but tasteful sum" of $2,500 per month.  
The following facts are relevant to the issues presented for en banc consideration. 
Padrick is a principal and owner of Obsidian, which provides advisory 
services to businesses, including businesses in distress.  In December 2008, 
Obsidian was retained to provide services to the bankruptcy estate of an Oregon 
company called "Summit."  (2-SER-94-98.)  Padrick eventually became Summit's 
Chapter 11 trustee and, later, trustee of its liquidating trust.  (Pls. Trial Ex. 30.)  At 
all times, Padrick sought to recover the maximum amount possible for Summit's 
creditors, virtually all of whom were defrauded Summit clients because it turned 
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out the Summit principals had been running a Ponzi scheme and misappropriating 
client funds.  (2-SER-68-70.)  Padrick has recouped over 85% of the stolen money 
to date, an extraordinary result in a Chapter 11 case.  (Id.)  The Summit principals 
have been convicted of fraud.  (2-SER-70.)   
In 2010, Cox, a self-proclaimed "investigative blogger," with whom 
Plaintiffs had no prior relationship or contact, began posting false statements about 
Plaintiffs on various websites, including ethicscomplaint.com and 
bankruptcycorruption.com.  (2-SER-155-187.)  In her posts, Cox repeatedly calls 
Plaintiffs "criminals" who have committed "fraud," "tax fraud," "corruption," 
"deceit on the government," "money laundering," "defamation," "harassment," and 
other crimes, mostly related to Summit.  (Id.)  She asserts that Plaintiffs have 
bribed politicians and media (2-SER-161) and that "many" people have told her 
Padrick "is not above killing someone to shut them up" (2-SER-170). 
Plaintiffs sent a cease-and-desist letter in December 2010, demanding 
Cox stop making false statements about them.  (2-SER-119.)  Cox immediately 
posted online that she would continue "exposing" Plaintiffs' crimes in her posts "in 
great detail and daily []...FOREVER."  (2-SER-171.)  On December 25, 2010, Cox 
again posted false statements on bankruptcycorruption.com ("the 12/25/10 post"), 
accusing Plaintiffs of tax fraud and other crimes.  (2-SER-115.)  Per Cox, this post 
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has gone "viral," is "everywhere," and, due to Cox's Internet skills, appears as a top 
search result—along with her other derogatory posts—whenever someone searches 
online for Padrick or Obsidian.  (2-SER-103-110.)   
Plaintiffs sued Cox for defamation.  Almost immediately, Cox offered 
her "services" to Plaintiffs.  (2-SER-123.)  For $2,500 a month, Cox would take 
down her own posts, "protect" Obsidian's online reputation from people like her, 
and "promote" its business.  (Id.)  Plaintiffs rejected Cox's extortion attempt.   
It is undisputed that Cox's derogatory statements about Plaintiffs are 
all completely false and that she made no effort to verify them.  (E.g., 2-SER-87-
89.)  Nonetheless, the district court allowed only one post to go to the jury—the 
12/25/10 post, which appeared on a website that looked more legitimate to the 
court.  (1-SER-33-35.)  The court ruled on summary judgment that all of Cox's 
other false statements were constitutionally protected "opinion."  (1-SER-49.)  It 
noted that anything posted on an online blog is "inherently" unlikely to be 
actionable.  (1-SER-9.) 
The parties were ordered to submit instruction requests and trial 
memoranda a week before trial.  (Docket 39.)  Cox did not request any 
instructions.  In her memorandum, Cox argued that the "actual malice" standard of 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) applied because Plaintiffs 
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were "public figures."  (Docket 81 at 4-6.)  Separately, she argued two Oregon 
statutory defenses based on her being "media."  (Id. at 1-4.)  The district court 
rejected Cox's "public figure" argument, holding that Plaintiffs were not public 
figures.  (1-ER-39-43.)  It construed Cox's "media" argument to implicate Gertz v. 
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974), in which the Supreme Court adopted a 
negligence standard for media defendants in defamation actions, and explained 
why it was rejecting Cox's argument that she was "media."  (1-ER-7; 1-ER-43.)     
The case proceeded to trial.  At the close of evidence, the court 
proposed instructions, including an instruction that knowledge and intent are not 
elements of defamation under Oregon law.  (2-ER-181.)  The court asked if the 
parties had any objections, and Cox said twice she did not.  (2-SER-111-114).  The 
court then gave the instructions.  Recognizing the great damage Cox has caused to 
Plaintiffs' reputations, the jury awarded $2.5 million to Plaintiffs.  (2-SER-56.) 
After verdict, Cox obtained counsel, who moved for a new trial based 
on instructional error.  Counsel made a host of new constitutional arguments, 
including that the "negligence" standard should be extended to non-media 
defendants like Cox.  Delighted, Cox told the press:  "I recommend that everyone 
go pro se and lawyer up for the appeal, this way you get to introduce more 
elements into the case."  (Docket 115 Ex. 1.)    
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Until the new trial motion, the district court had never considered 
whether the "negligence" standard should be extended to non-media defendants.  
The only argument Cox had made was, "I am media."  (1-ER-13 (new trial 
decision).)  Her new trial motion raised "an entirely different argument"—that 
there is "no special First Amendment protection for 'media' defendants."  (1-ER-
14.)  Applying Rule 51(d)(2), the court refused to revisit its instructions except for 
"plain error."  (1-ER-5-7.)  It noted that there was a common law exception to Rule 
51 but that Cox did not meet its requirements.  (Id.)  Finding the law unsettled 
regarding extension of Gertz to non-media defendants, the court found no plain 
error in its instruction and denied a new trial.  (1-ER-14-24.) 
PRESERVATION REQUIREMENTS FOR  
INSTRUCTIONAL ERRORS IN THIS CIRCUIT 
The panel's de novo review of an unpreserved instructional error is 
contrary to the express language of Rule 51, as amended in 2003.  Moreover, the 
panel has taken what used to be a narrow historic common law exception to Rule 
51, gutted its three requirements, and thereby created a hopelessly broad new 
exception that is impossible to apply in practice and will result in countless 
improper appeals and new trials.  If the Court intends to keep the historic common 
law exception, notwithstanding the 2003 amendments to Rule 51, it is critical that 
the Court squarely address what is required to qualify for that exception and avoid 
Case: 12-35238     02/07/2014          ID: 8971539     DktEntry: 53-1     Page: 10 of 25 (10 of 44)
7 
Rule 51.  Otherwise, a flood of improperly preserved instructional errors will be 
submitted to the Court for de novo review.   
I. Everyone Agrees That Cox Did Not Comply With Rule 51  
When a case goes to trial, the jury instructions are the moment when 
the rubber meets the road.  When the trial court informs the parties of its proposed 
instructions and asks for any objections, parties must decide what arguments to 
preserve for appeal.  It is also the final opportunity for parties to make new 
arguments that might affect the instructions.   
Rule 51 is very clear about the requirements to preserve instructional 
error.  Rule 51(a)-(c) provides the procedures for parties to request instructions, for 
the court to propose instructions, and for parties to object to the proposed 
instructions, including "how" and "when" to object.  If a party "properly objected" 
to "an instruction actually given," Rule 51(d)(1)(A) allows that party to "assign 
error" to the instruction.  Otherwise, Rule 51(d)(2) limits review to "plain error."   
Here, Cox assigns error to an instruction actually given.
1
  It is 
undisputed that Cox did not comply with Rule 51, as the panel recognizes and Cox 
concedes.  (Cox Op Brief 31.)  Thus, under the plain text of current Rule 51, Cox is 
limited to "plain error" review.  Nonetheless, the panel applied de novo review, 
                                           
1
 Cox did not request any instructions so Rule 51(d)(1)(B), which addresses errors 
in failing to give an instruction that was "properly requested," is irrelevant. 
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citing an historic common law exception to Rule 51.  (Panel Op. 7-8.) 
Given that Rule 51 now expressly provides for "plain error" review of 
any instructional errors not preserved in accordance with Rule 51, the court should 
consider en banc whether the historic common law exception survives the 2003 
amendments.  See, e.g., United States v. Kilbride, 584 F.3d 1240 (9th Cir. 2009) 
("In the absence of a timely objection to the jury instructions, we review for plain 
error.") (citation omitted).  If it does, the en banc court should conclusively address 
the scope of that exception.  Otherwise, the panel has adopted an exception so 
sweeping that it renders Rule 51 meaningless in this Circuit, in contravention of 
prior case law recognizing a "sole," very "limited" exception.  
II. The "Sole" Historic Common Law Exception   
Before the 2003 amendments to Rule 51—which added "plain error" 
review for errors not preserved in accordance with Rule 51—this Circuit did not 
allow plain error review, making it "the strictest enforcer of Rule 51."  Voohries–
Larson v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 241 F.3d 707, 713 (9th Cir. 2001).  The Court 
recognized a "sole" exception to Rule 51, sometimes called the "pointless 
formality" or "futility" exception, which applied only if three requirements were 
met:   
(1) throughout the trial the party argued the disputed matter 
with the court;  
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(2) it is clear from the record that the court knew the party's 
grounds for disagreement with the instruction; and  
(3) the party offered an alternative instruction.   
Medtronic, Inc. v. White, 526 F.3d 487, 495 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Gulliford v. 
Pierce Co., 136 F.3d 1345, 1348 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 828 (1998) 
(three requirements for "limited exception" to "strict interpretation of FRCP 51"); 
Voohries–Larson, 241 F.3d at 714 (three requirements); United States v. Klinger, 
128 F.3d 705, 711 (9th Cir. 1997) (three requirements for "sole exception").   
The panel purports to apply that common law exception here, but in 
fact adopts a much broader new exception because it is undisputed that Cox does 
not meet the criteria for the historic exception.  (Panel Op. 7-8.)  Cox concedes that 
she does not meet the third criterion—offering an alternative instruction.  (Cox 
Reply 18.)  Moreover, regarding the first and second criteria, Cox never argued, let 
alone throughout trial, that Gertz applied to non-media defendants, as the district 
court itself explained in denying a new trial.  (1-ER-13-14.)  All Cox ever said 
was, "I am media."  The district court never considered whether the negligence 
standard might be extended to non-media defendants, and it certainly did not rule 
on that issue, because no one ever raised it.  (Id.)  The only issue the court 
considered (and ruled on) was whether Cox was "media." 
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According to the panel decision, the fact that Cox made one specific 
First Amendment argument before trial ("I am media"), which the trial court 
rejected, was sufficient to preserve for de novo appellate review any and every 
First Amendment argument she might ever make, even one that is contrary to the 
one she actually made.  She does not have to comply with Rule 51.  She does not 
have to meet the requirements of the historic common law exception, including 
making the "disputed" argument "throughout the trial" and offering an "alternative 
instruction."  All she has to do is invoke "the First Amendment" and then wait and 
see whether she loses at trial, in which case she can make a host of new arguments 
to get a new trial.  (Panel Op. 8.)  The panel's expansive new exception to Rule 51 
is inconsistent with past case law in this Circuit and puts a terrible burden on trial 
courts and opposing litigants.   
III. Loya and Dorn Demonstrate Why En Banc Consideration Is Needed 
The panel cites Loya v. Desert Sands Unified School District, 721 
F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1983) and Dorn v. Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 
1183 (9th Cir. 2005) as authority for de novo review in this case.  (Panel Op. 7-8.)  
Both cases were tried under the pre-2003 version of Rule 51.  In Loya, 721 F.2d at 
282, the district court imposed "limitations on the manner in which objections were 
to be placed on the record," and the appellant objected in the manner allowed.  In 
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Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189, the district court "warned" the appellant not to "rehash" 
any further an argument made throughout trial and repeatedly rejected by the court.  
Citing the common law exception, both panels found the alleged error preserved. 
It is unclear whether the parties in Loya and Dorn actually satisfied 
the three requirements for the "sole" historic common law exception to Rule 51, or 
whether the panels meant to adopt a new "second" exception for cases in which the 
district court interferes with a party's ability to comply with Rule 51.  If the latter, 
it certainly would have no relevance here, because the district court in no way 
interfered with Cox's ability to comply with Rule 51.   
Regardless, the failure of panels of this Court to consistently 
recognize and apply the three specific requirements for the historic common law 
exception to Rule 51 is causing a disintegration of the preservation requirements 
for instructional errors in this Circuit, once the "strictest enforcer" of Rule 51.  The 
fact that the panel purported to apply the exception here when it is undisputed that 
Cox did not meet its requirements shows how far the preservation requirements 
have deteriorated. The panel's broad new exception to Rule 51 should be rejected. 
IV. The Standard of Review Determines the Outcome  
The difference between de novo and "plain error" review is often 
outcome-determinative, including here.  Cox could not obtain reversal on "plain 
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error" review because the panel is announcing new law on a "question of first 
impression" in this Circuit.  (Panel Op. 3.)  See United States v. Anekwu, 695 F.3d 
967, 973 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2379 (2013) (stating that "plain 
error" is "clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute"); United 
States v. Dupas, 419 F.3d 916, 924 (9th Cir. 2005) ("For an error to be plain, it 
must be 'clear' or 'obvious' under current law.").
2
  While the panel is free to adopt a 
negligence standard for non-media defendants prospectively, there is no "plain 
error" in such circumstances.  E.g., Kilbride, 584 F.3d at 1255 (announcing new 
First Amendment rule prospectively, but affirming on "plain error" review of jury 
instructions because the law was previously unsettled).   
"OPINION" SPEECH AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
There is a second, equally important issue that warrants en banc 
consideration.  Under the panel decision, anyone who makes false statements on 
matters of public concern—including criminal allegations (which the panel says 
are "generally" matters of public concern)—will only be subject to liability in this 
Circuit if they were at least negligent.  The extension of the negligence standard to 
                                           
2
 The Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to decide whether to extend the 
negligence standard to non-media defendants, and the few courts to address the 
issue are split, as Cox's own amicus explains.  (Plaintiffs' Response Brief 31-36; 
Reporters Committee Amicus Brief 5-6.)  No one could fairly claim that the law on 
this issue was clear, obvious, and not subject to reasonable dispute.  
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non-media defendants, who do not have editors or journalistic standards to worry 
about, makes the Supreme Court's decision in Milkovich more important than ever.  
Under Milkovich, any defamatory statement that a reasonable juror could find to 
imply a verifiable fact is actionable.  The panel decision, holding that Cox's 
statements accusing Plaintiffs of various crimes are non-actionable "pure opinion," 
is inconsistent with Milkovich and post- Milkovich  decisions of this Court.   
In Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 3-5, a high school wrestling team had an 
altercation with a visiting team.  After investigation, the athletic association 
censured the team's coach, Milkovich, and took disciplinary action against the 
team.  Parents and wrestlers sued the association.  Milkovich testified, suggesting 
under oath that he and his team were entirely innocent.  The disciplinary action 
was subsequently overturned.  A local reporter wrote an article about the lawsuit.  
Entitled "Maple beat the law with 'the big lie,'" the basic theme was that Milkovich 
had lied to obtain a favorable decision. 
The Supreme Court held that this type of speech is not protected by 
the First Amendment.  Id. at 21-22.  It firmly rejected a separate constitutional 
privilege for "opinion."  Id. at 18.  It also made clear that couching statements in 
"opinion" language, such as "I think" or "in my opinion," is irrelevant.  Id.  "If a 
speaker says, 'In my opinion John Jones is a liar,' he implies a knowledge of facts 
Case: 12-35238     02/07/2014          ID: 8971539     DktEntry: 53-1     Page: 17 of 25 (17 of 44)
14 
which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth."  Id.  The dispositive 
question is whether the speaker is seriously asserting or implying a "fact" 
susceptible of being proved true or false.  Id. at 21-22.  If so, it is actionable.  Id.  
Thus, the statements in Milkovich were actionable because the reporter implied that 
Milkovich had committed the crime of perjury, an "objectively verifiable event" 
susceptible of being proved true or false.  Id.  It did not matter that the article was 
an editorial (a "well-recognized home of opinion and comment"), that the speaker 
had an apparent bias (the article was published in the visiting team's home 
newspaper), or that the "tone" of the article was "pointed, exaggerated, and heavily 
laden with emotional rhetoric and moral outrage."  Id. at 31-33 (dissent).  The 
statements implying facts were actionable.  Id. at 21-22.   
Here, Cox has repeatedly asserted that Plaintiffs are "criminals" 
engaged in various specific crimes, including tax fraud, corruption, deceit on the 
government, money laundering, defamation, harassment, fraud against the 
government, and solar tax credit fraud.  (2-SER-155-187.)  She says Plaintiffs have 
bribed politicians and media.  (2-SER-161.)  She claims "many" people have told 
her Padrick "is not above killing someone to shut them up."  (2-SER-170.)    
The panel's conclusion that these statements are protected by the First 
Amendment cannot stand under Milkovich.  The panel either misapplies Unelko 
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Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049 (9th Cir. 1990), creating confusion in this Circuit, 
or reveals through its application of Unelko that current Ninth Circuit standards for 
protected speech under the First Amendment conflict with Milkovich.   
Whether a defamatory statement is actionable under Milkovich turns 
solely on whether the statement was made seriously and could be found by a 
reasonable juror to imply a "fact" susceptible of being proved true or false.  
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 21.  Here, it is readily apparent that Cox does not mean her 
accusations in any loose, figurative, or hyperbolic sense.  She is literally and 
seriously accusing Plaintiffs of committing crimes, which is susceptible of being 
proved true or false, as any government prosecutor will attest.
3
  The Supreme 
Court did not hesitate to find the perjury accusation in Milkovich actionable.  Cox's 
general tenor and writing style may make more discerning readers (such as federal 
judges) question her reliability as an information source, but it does not negate the 
impression that she is seriously asserting and implying facts.  Indeed, Cox touts 
herself as an "investigative blogger" who tells the "truth" and "facts" to "expose" 
corruption, give consumers "knowledge," and reveal the "truth."  (E.g., 2-SER-
155-156; 2-SER-166-168; 2-SER-178.)  She assures readers she has "only posted 
                                           
3
 Plaintiffs did not seek to impose liability for statements that are loose or 
figurative, and unverifiable, such as calling Plaintiffs "thugs," "evil doers," and 
"assholes." 
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truth" and has "tons of proof."
4
  (E.g., 2-SER-187; 2-SER-161; 2-SER-168.)   
These statements are actionable under Milkovich.  They are also 
actionable under post-Milkovich decisions in this Circuit.  See Unelko, 912 F.2d at 
1053 (recognizing that Milkovich "effectively overruled" earlier Ninth Circuit 
decisions).  In Unelko, 912 F.2d at 1049, Andy Rooney's statement that Rain-X 
"didn't work," made during a "humorous and satirical" broadcast about products 
people had sent him, was held actionable because it was intended as a statement of 
fact, even though Rooney often made rhetorical and hyperbolic statements.  In 
Rodriguez v. Panayiotou, 314 F.3d 979, 987 (9th Cir. 2002), George Michael's use 
of "colorful and humorous language" to describe a police officer engaging in lewd 
acts while arresting him did not negate the impression that he was "seriously" 
alleging lewd conduct occurred, which was susceptible to being proved true or 
false.  In Manufactured Home Communities, Inc. v. County of San Diego, 544 F.3d 
959 (9th Cir. 2008), saying someone "lied" to county officials and implying they 
had a "reputation for driving out elderly tenants" was actionable.  Regardless, 
Cox's statements are actionable under Milkovich, so, to the extent this Court's law 
                                           
4
 The panel's suggestion that no reasonable person would take Cox's posts seriously 
because of her writing style, even though she means them seriously, has no basis in 
law or fact.  (See Pls. Response Brief 65-66.)  In reality, even the most discerning 
readers tend to believe there must be some truth to Cox's allegations.  Where there 
is smoke, there must be fire. 
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conflicts with Milkovich, it must be put back in line with Milkovich. 
Finally, the panel's implicit focus on their own assessment of 
Defendant's credibility, rather than the serious and objectively verifiable nature of 
her defamatory statements, creates a perverse incentive for bloggers and others to 
make false statements in as loud and bombastic a manner as possible to attain 
maximum constitutional protection.  This is particularly troubling when the panel 
has also said that criminal allegations are generally "matters of public concern."  
(Panel Op. 13.)  The resulting message is that if you are going to defame someone, 
do it by accusing them of a crime, then mix in name-calling and exclamation marks 
to get complete constitutional immunity.   
That is not the law.  Over the past five decades, the Supreme Court 
has struck a very difficult and delicate balance between the First Amendment and 
state defamation laws.  See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 23 ("We believe our decision in 
the present case holds the balance true.").  Failing to faithfully apply Milkovich 
while simultaneously extending Gertz throws off that balance entirely.  The 
Supreme Court has recognized many times that there are two sides to the equation.   
The numerous decisions [] establishing First Amendment 
protection for defendants in defamation actions surely 
demonstrate the Court's recognition of the Amendment's vital 
guarantee of free and uninhibited discussion of public issues.  
But there is also another side to the equation; we have regularly 
acknowledged the important social values which underlie the 
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law of defamation, and recognized that society has a pervasive 
and strong interest in preventing and redressing attacks upon 
reputation. * * *  The destruction that defamatory falsehood can 
bring is, to be sure, often beyond the capacity of the law to 
redeem.  Yet, imperfect though it is, an action for damages is 
the only hope for vindication or redress the law gives to a man 
whose reputation has been falsely dishonored.   
Id. at 22-23 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).  
Online speech has no more constitutional protection than any other 
kind of speech.  In re Anonymous Online Speakers, 661 F.3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 
2011).  False statements published online certainly are no less damaging.  To the 
contrary, because "the Internet provides a virtually unlimited, inexpensive, and 
almost immediate means of communications with tens, if not hundreds, of millions 
of people, the dangers of its misuse cannot be ignored."  Cohen v. Google, Inc., 
887 N.Y.S.2d 424, 428 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (ordering Google to identify 
anonymous blogger who posted defamatory statements); see also, e.g., Fodor v. 
Doe, No. 3:10-CV-0798, 2011 WL 1629572 *1(D. Nev.) (regarding blog posting 
that implicated plaintiff in "criminal activity to defraud investors").   
Here, the panel decision hits defamed citizens with a double whammy.  
If publicly accused of a crime, you not only must prove at least "negligence" to 
obtain relief, but you will have no relief at all if the speaker uses run-on sentences, 
mixes in name-calling, and publishes the defamatory statements on a "non-
Case: 12-35238     02/07/2014          ID: 8971539     DktEntry: 53-1     Page: 22 of 25 (22 of 44)
19 
professional" website.  (Panel Op. 17.)  That is not the law under Milkovich, and 
this Court must conform its case law to Milkovich.  Otherwise people like Cox, 
who do not hesitate to broadcast to the world false statements about other people, 
will do so with impunity in the Ninth Circuit.   
DATED this 7th day of February, 2014. 
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Before: Arthur L. Alarcón, Milan D. Smith, Jr., 
and Andrew D. Hurwitz, Circuit Judges. 
Opinion by Judge Hurwitz 
SUMMARY 
Defamation 
The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district 
court’s judgment awarding compensatory damages to a 
bankruptcy trustee On a defamation claim against an Internet 
blogger. 
The panel held that Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 
323, 350 (1974) (holding that the First Amendment required 
only a "negligence standard for private defamation actions"), 
is not limited to cases with institutional media defendants. 
The panel further held that the blog post at issue addressed a 
matter of public concern, and the district court should have 
instructed the jury that it could not find the blogger liable for 
defamation unless it found that she acted negligently. The 
panel held that the bankruptcy trustee did not become a 
"public official" simply by virtue of court appointment, or by 
receiving compensation from the court. The panel remanded 
for a new trial on the blog post at issue, and affirmed the 
district court’s summary judgment on the other blog posts 
that were deemed constitutionally protected opinions. 
* This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has 
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader. 
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OPINION 
HURWITZ, Circuit Judge: 
This case requires us to address a question of first 
impression: What First Amendment protections are afforded 
a blogger sued for defamation? We hold that liability for a 
defamatory blog post involving a matter of public concern 
cannot be imposed without proof of fault and actual damages. 
I. 
Kevin Padrick is a principal of Obsidian Finance Group, 
LLC (Obsidian), a firm that provides advice to financially 
distressed businesses. In December 2008, Summit 
Accommodators, Inc. (Summit), retained Obsidian in 
connection with a contemplated bankruptcy. After Summit 
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filed for reorganization, the bankruptcy court appointed 
Padrick as the Chapter 11 trustee. Because Summit had 
misappropriated funds from clients, Padrick’s principal task 
was to marshal the firm’s assets for the benefit of those 
clients. 
After Padrick’s appointment, Crystal Cox published blog 
posts on several websites that she created, accusing Padrick 
and Obsidian of fraud, corruption, money-laundering, and 
other illegal activities in connection with the Summit 
bankruptcy. Cox apparently has a history of making similar 
allegations and seeking payoffs in exchange for retraction. 
See David Carr, When Truth Survives Free Speech, N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 1], 2011, at BI. Padrick and Obsidian sent Cox 
a cease-and-desist letter, but she continued posting 
allegations. This defamation suit ensued. 
A. 
The district court held that all but one of Cox’s blog posts 
were constitutionally protected opinions because they 
employed figurative and hyperbolic language and could not 
be proved true or false. Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 812 
F. Supp. 2d 1220, 1232-34 (D. Or. 2011). The court held, 
however, that a December 25, 2010 blog post on 
bankruptcycorruption. corn made "fairly specific allegations 
[that] a reasonable reader could understand . . . to imply a 
provable fact assertion"i.e., that Padrick, in his capacity as 
bankruptcy trustee, failed to pay $174,000 in taxes owed by 
Summit. Id. at 1238. The district judge therefore allowed 
that single defamation claim to proceed to a jury trial. The 
jury found in favor of Padrick and Obsidian, awarding the 
former $1 .5 million and the latter $1 million in compensatory 
damages. 
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B. 
In a pretrial memorandum, Coxthen representing 
herselfraised two First Amendment arguments concerning 
the liability standards that should govern this case. First, Cox 
argued that because the December 25 blog post involved a 
matter of public concern, Padrick and Obsidian had the 
burden of proving her negligence in order to recover for 
defamation, and that they could not recover presumed 
damages absent proof that she acted with New York Times 
Co. v. Sullivan "actual malice"that is, that she knew the 
post was false or acted with reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. See 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). Cox alternatively 
argued that Padrick and Obsidian were public figures, and 
thus were required to prove that Cox made the statements 
against them with actual malice. Id. 
On the day before trial, the district court rejected both 
arguments in an oral decision. In a written decision, issued 
two days later, the judge explained that Padrick and Obsidian 
were not required to prove either negligence or actual 
damages because Cox had failed to submit "evidence 
suggestive of her status as a journalist." Obsidian Fin. Grp., 
LLCv. Cox,No. 3:1 1-cv-00057-HZ,201 1 WL5999334,at*5 
(D. Or. Nov. 30, 2011). The district court also ruled that 
neither Padrick nor Obsidian was an all-purpose public figure 
or a limited public figure based upon Padrick’s role as a 
bankruptcy trustee, finding that they had not injected 
themselves into a public controversy, but rather that Cox had 
"created the controversy. . . ." Id. at *4 
After closing arguments, the district court instructed the 
jury that under Oregon law, "Defendant’s knowledge of 
whether the statements at issue were true or false and 
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defendant’s intent or purpose in publishing those statements 
are not elements of the claim and are not relevant to the 
determination of liability." The court further instructed that 
the "plaintiffs are entitled to receive reasonable compensation 
for harm to reputation, humiliation, or mental suffering even 
if plaintiff does not present evidence that proves actual 
damages . . . because the law presumes that the plaintiffs 
suffered these damages." The jury verdicts in favor of 
Padrick and Obsidian followed. 
Coxnow represented by counselmoved for a new 
trial. In its order denying that motion, the district court 
acknowledged that Cox had argued that "she was entitled to 
certain First Amendment protections, including requiring 
plaintiffs to establish liability by proving that [she] acted with 
some degree of fault, whether it be negligence or ’actual 
malice.’" Obsidian Fin. Grp., LL  v. Cox, No. 3:11 -cv-
00057-HZ, 2012 WL 1065484, at *7  (D. Or. Mar, 27, 2012). 
But, the judge again rejected Cox’s arguments that Padrick 
and Obsidian "were public figures, and that the blog post 
referred to a matter of public concern," and thus concluded 
that a showing of fault was not required to establish liability, 
and that presumed damages could be awarded, Id. at *4 
Cox appeals from the denial of her motion for a new trial. 
Obsidian and Padrick cross-appeal, contending that their 
defamation claims about the other blog posts should have 
gone to the jury. We have jurisdiction over both appeals 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We reverse the denial of a 
motion for a new trial if the district court has made a mistake 
of law. Moiski v. MJ. Cable, Inc., 481 F.3d 724, 729 (9th 
Cir. 2007). We "review de novo whether a jury instruction 
misstates the law." Dream Games ofAriz., Inc. v. PC Onsite, 
561 F.3d 983, 988 (9th Cir. 2009) (quotation marks and 
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citation omitted). And we review a grant of summary 
judgment de novo, Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 697 F.3d 1235, 1238 
(9th Cir. 2012). 
II. 
Cox does not contest on appeal the district court’s finding 
that the December 25 blog post contained an assertion of fact; 
nor does she contest the jury’s conclusions that the post was 
false and defamatory. She challenges only the district court’s 
rulings that (a) liability could be imposed without a showing 
of fault or actual damages and (b) Padrick and Obsidian were 
not public officials. 
A. 
After the district court’s orders on the issues raised in her 
pretrial memorandum, Coxthen still representing 
herselfdid not propose specific jury instructions. When 
asked by the district court whether she wished to do so, she 
stated that she had no objection to the court’s proposed jury 
instructions, which were consistent with its earlier First 
Amendment rulings. Padrick and Obsidian argue that Cox 
therefore waived any First Amendment objections to the jury 
instructions. 
We disagree. To preserve an argument about a jury 
instruction for appeal, a party generally must make a specific 
contemporaneous objection to the instruction "on the record, 
stating distinctly the matter objected to and the grounds for 
the objection." Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (c)(1). But, "when the trial 
court has rejected plaintiff’s posted objection and is aware of 
the plaintiff’s position, further objection by the plaintiff is 
unnecessary." Lo,ya v, Desert Sands Unified Sch. Dist., 721 
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F.2d 279, 282 (9th Cir. 1983) (citing Brown v. Avemco Inv. 
Corp., 603 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979)); see also Dorn v. 
Burlington N. Santa Fe R.R. Co., 397 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th 
Cir. 2005) ("In light of its definitive ruling on a motion in 
limine and subsequent warning about rehashing the issue, the 
district court was fully informed of Burlington’s position on 
the jury instructions . . . 
The district court here was fully informed before trial of 
Cox’s First Amendment arguments and had rejected them 
definitively before the close of evidence. "[A]ny further 
objection would have been superfluous and futile . . . 
Dorn, 397 F.3d at 1189. Indeed, in denying Cox’s new trial 
motion, the district judge specifically noted that he had 
instructed the defendant to raise her legal arguments in her 
trial memorandum, and that he understood those arguments 
to be that "she was entitled to certain First Amendment 
protections, including requiring plaintiffs to establish liability 
by proving that defendant acted with some degree of fault, 
whether it be negligence or ’actual malice." Obsidian Fin. 
Grp., LLC v. Cox, 2012 WL 1065484, at *7  In ruling on the 
new trial motion, the district court initially suggested that 
Cox had waived those arguments by not objecting to the jury 
instructions, but in the end again treated them on the merits 
and rejected them. Under the facts of this case, Cox 
preserved the issues raised in her motion for new trial for 
review. 
B. 
The Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan began the construction of a First 
Amendment framework concerning the level of fault required 
for defamation liability. 376 U.S. 254. Sullivan held that 
Case: 12-35238     02/07/2014          ID: 8971539     DktEntry: 53-2     Page: 9 of 19 (34 of 44)
Case: 12-35238 01/17/2014 	 ID: 8942579 DktEntry: 45-1 Page: 9 of 18 
	 (9o ,123) 
OBSIDIAN FINANCE GROUP V. Cox 	 9 
when a public official seeks damages for defamation, the 
official must show "actual malice"that the defendant 
published the defamatory statement "with knowledge that it 
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or 
not." Id. at 280. A decade later, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 
held that the First Amendment required only a "negligence 
standard for private defamation actions." 418 U.S. 323, 350 
(1974). This case involves the intersection between Sullivan 
and Gertz, an area not yet fully explored by this Circuit, in the 
context of a medium of publicationthe Internetentirely 
unknown at the time of those decisions. 
1. 
Padrick and Obsidian first argue that the Gertz negligence 
requirement applies only to suits against the institutional 
press. Padrick and Obsidian are correct in noting that Gertz 
involved an institutional media defendant and that the Court’s 
opinion specifically cited the need to shield "the press and 
broadcast media from the rigors of strict liability for 
defamation." 418 U.S. at 348. We conclude, however, that 
the holding in Gertz sweeps more broadly. 
The Gertz court did not expressly limit its holding to the 
defamation of institutional media defendants. And, although 
the Supreme Court has never directly held that the Gertz rule 
applies beyond the institutional press, it has repeatedly 
refused in non-defamation contexts to accord greater First 
Amendment protection to the institutional media than to other 
speakers. In Bartnicki v. Vopper, for example, in deciding 
whether defendants could be held liable under a statute 
banning the redistribution of illegally intercepted telephone 
conversations, the Court expressly noted that "we draw no 
distinction between the media respondents and" a non- 
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institutional respondent. 532 U.S. 514, 525 & n.8 (2001). 
Similarly, in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., the Court held that 
the press gets no special immunity from laws that apply to 
others, including thosesuch as copyright lawthat target 
communication. 501 U.S. 663, 669-70 (1991). And in First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, a case involving 
campaign finance laws, the Court rejected the "suggestion 
that communication by corporate members of the institutional 
press is entitled to greater constitutional protection than the 
same communication by" non-institutional-press businesses. 
435 U. S. 765, 782 n,1 8(1978); see also Henry v. Collins, 380 
U.S. 356, 357 (1965) (per curiam) (applying Sullivan 
standard to a statement by an arrestcc); Garrison v. 
Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 67-68 (1964) (applying Sullivan 
standard to statements by an elected district attorney); 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 286 (applying identical First 
Amendment protection to a newspaper defendant and 
individual defendants). 
The Supreme Court recently emphasized the point in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission; "We have 
consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional 
press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other 
speakers." 558 U.S. 310, 352 (2010) (internal quotations 
omitted). In construing the constitutionality of campaign 
finance statutes, the Court cited with approval, id., the 
position of five Justices in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., that "in the context of defamation 
law, the rights of the institutional media are no greater and no 
less than those enjoyed by other individuals engaged in the 
same activities." 472 U.S. 749, 784 (1985) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("[T]he First Amendment gives no more protection to the 
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press in defamation suits than it does to others exercising 
their freedom of speech."). 
Like the Supreme Court, the Ninth Circuit has not directly 
addressed whether First Amendment defamation rules apply 
equally to both the institutional press and individual 
speakers.’ But every other circuit to consider the issue has 
held that the First Amendment defamation rules in Sullivan 
and its progeny apply equally to the institutional press and 
individual speakers. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 580 F.3d 
206, 219 n.13 (4thCir. 2009), affd, 131 S.Ct. 1207 (2011) 
("Any effort to justify a media/nonmedia distinction rests on 
unstable ground, given the difficulty of defining with 
precision who belongs to the ’media."); Flamm v. Am. Ass ’n 
of Univ. Women, 201 F3d 144,149 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding 
that "a distinction drawn according to whether the defendant 
is a member of the media or not is untenable"); In re IBP 
Confidential Bus. Documents Litig., 797 F.2d 632, 642 (8th 
Cir. 1986); Garcia v. Bd. ofEduc., 777 F.2d 1403, 1410 (10th 
Cir. 1985); Avins v. White, 627 F.2d 637,649 (3d Cir. 1980); 
Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 734n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975). 
We agree with our sister circuits. The protections of the 
First Amendment do not turn on whether the defendant was 
a trained journalist, formally affiliated with traditional news 
entities, engaged in conflict-of-interest disclosure, went 
Dun & Bradstreet held that presumed and punitive damages are 
constitutionally permitted in defamation cases without a showing of actual 
malice when the defamatory statements at issue do not involve matters of 
public concern. See 472 U.S. at 763. 
But cf. Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686, 694 n.4 (9th Cit. 
1998) (citing Gertz in a defamation ease in which the lead defendant was 
not a member of the institutional media). 
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beyond just assembling others’ writings, or tried to get both 
sides of a story. As the Supreme Court has accurately 
warned, a First Amendment distinction between the 
institutional press and other speakers is unworkable: "With 
the advent of the Internet and the decline of print and 
broadcast media. . . the line between the media and others 
who wish to comment on political and social issues becomes 
far more blurred." Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352. In 
defamation cases, the public-figure status of a plaintiff and 
the public importance of the statement at issuenot the 
identity of the speakerprovide the First Amendment 
touchstones. 
We therefore hold that the Gertz negligence requirement 
for private defamation actions is not limited to cases with 
institutional media defendants. But this does not completely 
resolve the Gertz dispute. Padrick and Obsidian also argue 
that they were not required to prove Cox’s negligence 
because Gertz involved a matter of public concern 3 and this 
case does not. 
2. 
The Supreme Court has "never considered whether the 
Gertz balance obtains when the defamatory statements 
involve no issue of public concern." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 
Gertz dealt with a libel claim brought by a Chicago lawyer who had 
been accused by the magazine of the John Birch Society of taking part in 
a Communist campaign to discredit local law enforcement agencies. See 
Dim & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 756. 
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U.S. at 757 (plurality opinion). 4 But even assuming that 
Gertz is limited to statements involving matters of public 
concern, Cox’s blog post qualifies. 
The December 25 post alleged that Padrick, a court-
appointed trustee, committed tax fraud while administering 
the assets of a company in a Chapter 11 reorganization, and 
called for the "IRS and the Oregon Department of Revenue 
to look" into the matter. Public allegations that someone is 
involved in crime generally are speech on a matter of public 
concern. See, e.g., Adventure Outdoors, Inc. v. Bloomberg, 
552 F.3d 1290, 1298 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that accusations 
of "alleged violations of federal gun laws" by gun stores were 
speech on "a matter of public concern"); Boule v. Hutton, 328 
F.3d 84, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that allegations of "fraud 
in the art market" involve "a matter of public concern"). This 
court has held that even consumer complaints of non-criminal 
conduct by a business can constitute matters of public 
concern. See Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981,989 (9th Cir. 
2009) (finding that a business owner’s refusal to give a refund 
to a customer who bought an allegedly defective product was 
a matter of public concern); Manufactured Home Cmtys., Inc. 
v. Cnty. of San Diego, 544 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2008) 
(treating claim that a mobile home park operator charged 
excessive rent as a matter of public concern). 
Cox’s allegations in this case are similarly a matter of 
public concern. Padrick was appointed by a United States 
Bankruptcy Court as the Chapter 11 trustee of a company that 
had defrauded its investors through a Ponzi scheme. That 
company retained him and Obsidian to advise it shortly 
Dun & Bradstreet dealt only with the Gertz rule on presumed damages, 
not the Gertz negligence standard. See 472 U.S. at 754-55, 
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before it filed for bankruptcy. The allegations against Padrick 
and his company raised questions about whether they were 
failing to protect the defrauded investors because they were 
in league with their original clients. 
Unlike the speech at issue in Dun & Bradstreet that the 
Court found to be a matter only of private concern, Cox’s 
December 25 blog post was not "solely in the individual 
interest of the speaker and its specific business audience." 
472 U.S. at 762 (plurality opinion). The post was published 
to the public at large, not simply made "available to only five 
subscribers, who, under the terms of the subscription 
agreement, could not disseminate it further.. . ." Id. And, 
Cox’s speech was not "like advertising" and thus "hardy and 
unlikely to be deterred by incidental state regulation." Id. 
Because Cox’s blog post addressed a matter of public 
concern, even assuming that Gertz is limited to such speech, 
the district court should have instructed the jury that it could 
not find Cox liable for defamation unless it found that she 
acted negligently. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The court also 
should have instructed the jury that it could not award 
presumed damages unless it found that Cox acted with actual 
malice. Id. at 349, 
C. 
Cox also argues that Padrick and Obsidian are 
"tantamount to public officials," because Padrick was a court-
appointed bankruptcy trustee. She contends that the jury 
therefore should have been instructed that, under the Sullivan 
standard, it could impose liability for defamation only if she 
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acted with actual malice.’ See 376 U.S. at 279-80. We 
disagree. 
Although bankruptcy trustees are "an integral part of the 
judicial process," Lonneker Farms, Inc. v. Kiobucher, 804 
F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1986), neither Padrick nor Obsidian 
became public officials simply by virtue of Padrick’s 
appointment. Padrick was neither elected nor appointed to a 
government position, and he did not exercise "substantial... 
control over the conduct of governmental affairs." Rosenblatt 
v, Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966). A Chapter 11 trustee can be 
appointed by the bankruptcy court for cause or when the best 
interests of the estate or creditors dictate. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 1104(a). But, an appointed trustee simply substitutes for, 
and largely exercises the powers of, a debtor-in-possession. 
11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). No one would contend that a debtor-in-
possession has become a public official simply by virtue of 
seeking Chapter 11 protection, and we can reach no different 
conclusion as to the trustee who substitutes for the debtor in 
administering a Chapter 11 estate. 
We also reject Cox’s argument that Padrick and Obsidian 
were "tantamount to public officials" because they received 
compensation from the court for their efforts. In Gertz, the 
Supreme Court held that there is "no such concept" as a "de 
facto public official," 418 U.S. at 351, and that a lawyer who 
had served briefly on several housing committees appointed 
by the mayor of Chicago, but who had never held "any 
remunerative governmental position," could not be 
Cox argued in her pretrial memorandum that Padrick and Obsidian 
were public figures, but contended in her motion for a new trial that 
Padrick was a public official. She raises only the public official argument 
on appeal. 
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considered a public official. Id. Bankruptcy trustees do not 
receive remuneration from the government. Their 
compensation is drawn from the assets of the Chapter 11 
estate they administer. See ii U.S.C. § 326(a). They are not 
rendered public officials by virtue of that compensation, any 
more than is an expert witness compensated by the estate. 
M. 
Padrick and Obsidian argue on cross-appeal that the 
district court erred in granting cox summary judgment as to 
her other blog posts. Among other things, those posts accuse 
Padrick and Obsidian of engaging in "illegal activity," 
including "corruption," "fraud," "deceit on the government," 
"money laundering," "defamation," "harassment," "tax 
crimes," and "fraud against the government." Cox also 
claimed that Obsidian paid off "media" and "politicians" and 
may have hired a hit man to kill her. 
In Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., the Supreme Court 
refused to create a blanket defamation exemption for 
"anything that might be labeled ’opinion." 497 U.S. 1, 18 
(1990). This court has held that "while ’pure’ opinions are 
protected by the First Amendment, a statement that ’may. 
imply a false assertion of fact’ is actionable." Partington v. 
Bugliosi, 56 17.3d 1147, 1153 (9th Cir. 1995) (quoting 
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 19). We have developed a three-part 
test to determine whether a statement contains an assertion of 
objective fact. Unelko Corp. v. Rooney, 912 F.2d 1049, 1053 
(9th Cir. 1990). The test considers "(1) whether the general 
tenor of the entire work negates the impression that the 
defendant was asserting an objective fact, (2) whether the 
defendant used figurative or hyperbolic language that negates 
that impression, and (3) whether the statement in question is 
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susceptible of being proved true or false." Partington, 56 
F.3dat 1153. 
As to the first factor, the general tenor of Cox’s blog posts 
negates the impression that she was asserting objective facts. 
The statements were posted on obsidianfinancesucks.com , a 
website name that leads "the reader of the statements [to be] 
predisposed to view them with a certain amount of skepticism 
and with an understanding that they will likely present one-
sided viewpoints rather than assertions of provable facts." 
Obsidian Fin. Grp., 812 F. Supp. 2d at 1232. The district 
judge correctly concluded that the "occasional and somewhat 
run-on[,] almost ’stream of consciousness’-like sentences 
read more like a journal or diary entry revealing [Cox’s] 
feelings rather than assertions of fact." Id. at 1233. 
As to the second factor, Cox’s consistent use of extreme 
language negates the impression that the blog posts assert 
objective facts. Cox regularly employed hyperbolic language 
in the posts, including terms such as "immoral," "really bad," 
"thugs," and "evil doers." Id. (quoting blog posts). Cox’s 
assertions that "Padrick hired a ’hit man’ to kill her" or "that 
the entire bankruptcy court system is corrupt" similarly dispel 
any reasonable expectation that the statements assert facts. 
Id. 
And, as to the third factor, the district court correctly 
found that, in the context of a non-professional website 
containing consistently hyperbolic language, Cox’s blog posts 
are "not sufficiently factual to be proved true or false." Id. at 
1234. We find no error in the court’s application of the 
Unelko test and reject the cross-appeal. 
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Iv. 
We reverse the district court’s judgment against Cox 
concerning the December 25, 2010 blog post and remand for 
a new trial consistent with this opinion. We affirm the 
district court’s summaryjudgment on Cox’s other blog posts. 
All parties are to bear their own costs on appeal. 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED. 
Case: 12-35238     02/07/2014          ID: 8971539     DktEntry: 53-2     Page: 19 of 19 (44 of 44)
